Full Report

The numbers behind Sportradar Group AG: as-reported financial statements and company metrics for FY2021–FY2025, traced to the source filings, opened with the share-price history those statements have to justify. Every linked figure opens the exact page of the filing it was printed on, with the statement row highlighted. Amounts in € thousands unless noted.

Reading notes: Sportradar reports under IFRS in euros and files on Form 20-F as a foreign private issuer. All figures are in thousands of euros exactly as printed ('Expressed in thousands of Euros'). The Class A shares trade in US dollars on Nasdaq under SRAD. FY2023-FY2025 income-statement, cash-flow and revenue-note figures come from the FY2025 Form 20-F; FY2022 from the FY2024 Form 20-F (income statement) and the FY2023 Form 20-F (balance sheet, cash flow, EPS); FY2021 from the FY2023 Form 20-F (income statement, cash flow) and the FY2021 Form 20-F (balance sheet). FY2019-FY2020 long-term figures are comparative columns of the FY2021 Form 20-F. Expense presentation changed in the FY2024 Form 20-F: 'Purchased services and licenses' and a single 'Depreciation and amortization' line were re-presented as 'Sport rights expenses (including amortization of capitalized sport rights licenses)', 'Purchased services' and 'Depreciation and amortization (excluding amortization of capitalized sport rights licenses)'. FY2022-FY2025 are shown on the new basis; FY2021 was never re-presented, so those three rows are blank for FY2021. As originally printed in the FY2023 Form 20-F (p.132), FY2021 showed Purchased services and licenses of (119,426) and Depreciation and amortization of (129,375). The Betting Technology and Solutions / Sports Content, Technology and Services revenue grouping was introduced in the FY2024 Form 20-F and disclosed back to FY2022 only. FY2021 revenue was reported on the earlier Rest of the World Betting / Betting AV / United States basis (RoW Betting 309,357; Betting AV 140,162; United States 71,700; Other 39,983) and is left blank in the product-group table.

Share Price — Available History Since March 2026

The stock closed at $14.68 on Jul 27, 2026 — down 20% over the window shown, trading between $12.35 and $19.69.

Source: market price feed, daily closes, Mar 2026–Jul 2026 — the feed marks this available history as partial. Price return only, excludes dividends.

FY2025 at a Glance

Source: FY2025 consolidated statements [1] [2] [3]. Click any linked figure to open the filing page with the row highlighted.

Revenue by Product Group

Revenue by Product Group	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Betting and Gaming Content	—	444,280	530,099	707,119	817,295
Managed Betting Services	—	135,157	173,391	199,871	229,775
Total Betting Technology and Solutions	—	579,437	703,490	906,990	1,047,070
Marketing and Media Services	—	105,478	126,629	146,919	181,568
Sports Performance	—	37,412	39,758	40,366	43,692
Integrity Services	—	7,861	7,744	12,281	17,635
Total Sports Content, Technologies and Services	—	150,751	174,131	199,566	242,895
Total Revenue	—	730,188	877,621	1,106,556	1,289,965
Total Revenue growth, derived	—	—	+20.2%	+26.1%	+16.6%

Source: Note 4 Revenue from contracts with customers — major product groups (FY2025 Form 20-F p.143; FY2022 column from the FY2024 Form 20-F p.145). The Betting Technology and Solutions / Sports Content, Technology and Services grouping was first reported in the FY2024 Form 20-F and is not available for FY2021. [4] [5]. Click any linked figure to open the filing page with the row highlighted.

Income Statement

Source: Consolidated Statements of Profit or Loss and Other Comprehensive Income (IFRS). FY2023–FY2025 from the FY2025 Form 20-F p.125; FY2022 from the FY2024 Form 20-F p.125 (re-presented sport rights basis); FY2021 from the FY2023 Form 20-F p.132. [1] [2] [3]. Click any linked figure to open the filing page with the row highlighted.

Columns marked E are consensus analyst estimates from S&P Capital IQ (CapIQ), shown alongside reported results for direct comparison; they are not company guidance.

Estimate source: S&P Capital IQ (CapIQ) consensus, as of 2026-07-28. Estimate figures are S&P Capital IQ consensus (vendor data — no filing page links). EPS and net income use the normalized (adjusted) consensus where the street reports it. Line-item analyst models (segments, drivers, KPIs) are in the Visible Alpha tab.

Balance Sheet

Source: Consolidated Statements of Financial Position. FY2024–FY2025 from the FY2025 Form 20-F p.126; FY2022–FY2023 from the FY2023 Form 20-F p.133; FY2021 from the FY2021 Form 20-F p.144. [6] [7] [8]. Click any linked figure to open the filing page with the row highlighted.

Cash Flow

Source: Consolidated Statements of Cash Flows. FY2023–FY2025 from the FY2025 Form 20-F p.128; FY2021–FY2022 from the FY2023 Form 20-F p.135. [9] [10]. Click any linked figure to open the filing page with the row highlighted.

Revenue by Region

Revenue by Region	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Europe	—	—	464,012	562,024	640,547
North America	—	—	195,883	301,269	366,210
AsiaPac and Middle East	—	—	108,412	116,466	134,430
LATAM and Caribbean	—	—	86,006	99,879	123,113
Africa	—	—	23,308	26,918	25,665
Total	—	—	877,621	1,106,556	1,289,965

Source: Note 5 Segmental information — Geographic information, FY2025 Form 20-F p.146. Revenue is attributed to the geographic billing location of customers. The FY2023 Form 20-F disclosed geography by country rather than by region, so FY2021–FY2022 are not comparable and are left blank. [11]. Click any linked figure to open the filing page with the row highlighted.

Long-Term Record

Fiscal year	Total revenue	Profit for the year	Diluted earnings per Class A share	Net cash from operating activities	Acquisition of intangible assets	Total equity
FY2019	380,403	11,665	0.05	145,966	(91,576)	154,044
FY2020	404,924	14,806	0.06	151,259	(91,956)	164,132
FY2021	561,202	12,787	0.05	132,221	(124,890)	735,634
FY2022	730,188	10,491	0.03	168,077	(154,266)	757,429
FY2023	877,621	33,894	0.11	258,645	(185,493)	872,837
FY2024	1,106,556	33,612	0.10	353,011	(222,288)	929,847
FY2025	1,289,965	100,324	0.31	403,015	(223,377)	978,337

Source: consolidated statements across filings; older years from the standardized feed [9] [6] [1] [10]. Click any linked figure to open the filing page with the row highlighted.

Operating KPIs

KPI	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Adjusted EBITDA	102,013	125,846	166,799	222,418	296,787
Adjusted EBITDA margin	18.2%	17.2%	19.0%	20.1%	23.0%
Customer Net Retention Rate	125%	119%	111%	127%	109%

Source: company-reported operating metrics [12] [13]. Click any linked figure to open the filing page with the row highlighted.

Analyst Consensus

Street ratings: 16 strong buy, 2 buy, 4 hold. Consensus: Strong Buy.

Estimate source: S&P Capital IQ (CapIQ) consensus, as of 2026-07-28. Estimate figures are S&P Capital IQ consensus (vendor data — no filing page links). EPS and net income use the normalized (adjusted) consensus where the street reports it. Line-item analyst models (segments, drivers, KPIs) are in the Visible Alpha tab.

Traceability

442 of 443 figures on this page (100%) link to the filing page where they are printed — click a linked figure to open the source PDF at that page with the row highlighted. Unlinked figures come from standardized data feeds or pre-filing years.

• Sportradar reports under IFRS in euros and files on Form 20-F as a foreign private issuer. All figures are in thousands of euros exactly as printed ('Expressed in thousands of Euros'). The Class A shares trade in US dollars on Nasdaq under SRAD.

• FY2023-FY2025 income-statement, cash-flow and revenue-note figures come from the FY2025 Form 20-F; FY2022 from the FY2024 Form 20-F (income statement) and the FY2023 Form 20-F (balance sheet, cash flow, EPS); FY2021 from the FY2023 Form 20-F (income statement, cash flow) and the FY2021 Form 20-F (balance sheet). FY2019-FY2020 long-term figures are comparative columns of the FY2021 Form 20-F.

• Expense presentation changed in the FY2024 Form 20-F: 'Purchased services and licenses' and a single 'Depreciation and amortization' line were re-presented as 'Sport rights expenses (including amortization of capitalized sport rights licenses)', 'Purchased services' and 'Depreciation and amortization (excluding amortization of capitalized sport rights licenses)'. FY2022-FY2025 are shown on the new basis; FY2021 was never re-presented, so those three rows are blank for FY2021. As originally printed in the FY2023 Form 20-F (p.132), FY2021 showed Purchased services and licenses of (119,426) and Depreciation and amortization of (129,375).

• The Betting Technology and Solutions / Sports Content, Technology and Services revenue grouping was introduced in the FY2024 Form 20-F and disclosed back to FY2022 only. FY2021 revenue was reported on the earlier Rest of the World Betting / Betting AV / United States basis (RoW Betting 309,357; Betting AV 140,162; United States 71,700; Other 39,983) and is left blank in the product-group table.

• Effective January 1, 2024 Sportradar has a single operating and reportable segment, so no segment-profit statement is shown. Adjusted EBITDA, Adjusted EBITDA margin and Customer Net Retention Rate are the company's own headline non-IFRS/operating metrics and are taken from the 'Key Financial and Operational Performance Indicators' tables. The FY2021-FY2022 retention figures were printed under the label 'Net Retention Rate'.

• Balance-sheet row labels are disambiguated where a filing prints the same caption twice: 'Trade and other payables (current)' is printed as 'Trade payables' in the FY2021-FY2024 filings and as 'Trade and other payables' in the FY2025 Form 20-F; 'Trade payables (non-current)' is the sport rights license payable; 'Loans and borrowings (non-current)' is the second of the two loans-and-borrowings lines.

• FY2019 total equity is the only long-term cell taken from the standardized data feed (the FY2021 Form 20-F balance sheet shows only 2020 and 2021) and carries no page link.

• Quarterly income statements and balance sheets are printed as single-quarter / point-in-time columns in Sportradar's quarterly results releases and are cited directly. Quarterly cash flows are printed year-to-date, so Q2 FY25, Q3 FY25, Q4 FY25 and Q4 FY24 are the exact difference between consecutive printed year-to-date statements; Q1 FY25 and Q1 FY26 are printed three-month figures. The run carries no quarterly cash-flow feed file, so no independent numeric cross-check of the derived quarters was possible; each subtraction reconciles exactly to the two printed year-to-date figures.

• 3 figure(s) differed between the data feed and the filing; the filing value is shown (see the run's metrics/metrics_tab.json for the audit trail).

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Sportradar Group AG's management explains the business in its own materials. The slides below do the most of that work, pulled from the documents preserved in Sources. Each source link opens the complete presentation at that slide in a new tab.

Investor Day 2025 — 2025

Management's fullest account of the business: what it sells, to whom, how the pricing works, and the 2027 targets it set for itself. · Open the full document →

Fourth Quarter & Full Year 2025 Earnings — FY2025

The most recent full-year scorecard: 2025 results, the first real read on IMG ARENA after closing, and 2026 guidance. · Open the full document →

First Quarter 2026 Earnings — Q1 2026

The latest quarter, and the first place two new lines of business — prediction markets and PlayRadar — are laid out. · Open the full document →

More from management

Third Quarter 2025 Earnings — Q3 2025 · 30 pages · The last quarter reported before IMG ARENA consolidated — the clean standalone run-rate of the old business. · Open →

Fourth Quarter & Full Year 2024 Earnings — FY2024 · 33 pages · Where the IMG ARENA acquisition was announced and the 2024 base year behind the 2027 targets was set. · Open →

Fourth Quarter & Full Year 2023 Earnings — FY2023 · 27 pages · The pre-Investor-Day baseline: €878m of revenue and what management was promising before the 2027 plan. · Open →

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Sportradar Group AG's management answers for the business every quarter. These are the exchanges that explain it best — verbatim, from the call transcripts preserved in Sources. Each link opens the full transcript at that page in a new tab.

Q1 2026 Earnings Call — Q1 FY2026

The most recent call, and the one where management had to defend the business model line by line against short-seller allegations while re-affirming guidance. · Open the full transcript →

The clearest read on whether the IMG rights actually cross-sell: uptake rates across the existing client base.

Carsten Koerl (Chief Executive Officer): It is this scale and expertise as well as the depth of our global client base that is enabling us to make great progress integrating the IMG rights portfolio and capitalizing on revenue synergies. Demand across our global client base has been strong with more than 75% of our core betting clients now consuming IMG content, including all Tier 1 operators. Of our clients who were previously not customers of IMG, nearly 60% are now purchasing IMG content from us.

p. 9 · Read in context →

Why margins are supposed to expand mechanically — straight-line rights amortisation plus a newly announced cost programme.

Craig Felenstein (Chief Financial Officer): Overall, we continue to anticipate meaningful margin expansion over the long term, given the inherent scale we have in our business and our long-term cost visibility, including the benefits of sports rights being amortized on a straight-line basis.

At the same time, we have recently initiated steps to further streamline our business and drive additional cost eficiencies. We anticipate these steps, which are expected to result in restructuring charges of between $13 million and $18 million during the remainder of the year, will drive additional operating leverage and optimize our organizational structure for sustained value creation.

p. 14 · Read in context →

Guidance philosophy after a soft Q1: the three things management is leaning on to hold the full-year number.

Craig Felenstein (CFO); Ryan Sigdahl (Craig-Hallum Capital Group): When you think about the guidance for the full year and what we expect, we do expect marketing services to grow definitely more in line with what it's done historically, excluding any onetime items. Some of the other things that we look at with regards to guidance for the full year that we are – gives us confidence that we'll ultimately get to where we guided to at the start of the year, one would be the marketing that we just talked about. Two would be the continued success that we're seeing with IMG and how it's resonating with our customers.

And the third and probably the biggest is we have really good sight lines right now, we think, with regards to some prediction market revenue opportunity that's going to happen in the predominant in the back half of the year. So those 3 things give us confidence that we're going to hit our guidance for 2026.

p. 17 · Read in context →

The hardest question of the call — short-seller claims on unregulated markets — answered with a revenue-exposure range.

Carsten Koerl (CEO); Jeffrey Stantial (analyst): The vast majority of our clients do not operate in unregulated markets, take a Flutter or take an Entain or take a FanDuel. We subtract this, and we are coming then down to a number which is low to mid-single digit. That's where we sit. In some cases, if you let now an AI system running through this, and of course, we did simulations with public market data, that might drop into the range of a maximum of 12%. We believe it's a low to mid-single-digit number of our total revenues, which are exposed. I hope that clarifies the situation.

p. 23 · Read in context →

Management's case that prediction markets expand the addressable market faster than they cannibalise sportsbook volume.

Carsten Koerl (CEO); Raymond Bowers (Wells Fargo): So that is a big population, which can now get an opinion on a sport event and monetize on this. That is in principally an expansion of the TAM. We might also discuss there is a TAM expansion because the age is dropping to 18. That's at the moment what we see. So we see that this additional market access is by far outpacing whatever cannibalization effect is in there. […] What I can tell you from talks with the CEOs of our clients is that the cannibalization is pretty small here. So looking to this, we see an outpacing TAM. We see an expansion opportunity for us, and this is something which excites us.

p. 27 · Read in context →

The contract structure in one answer: two-thirds fixed fee, one-third variable, with roughly a third of fixed repricing yearly.

Craig Felenstein (CFO); Shaun Kelley (Bank of America): So when you think about our company, about 2/3 of our revenue are fixed fee, 1/3 are variable out of the 2/3 that are fixed. Traditionally, about 1/3 comes up every single year, and that's not obviously on January 1. It comes up throughout the course of the year.

p. 32 · Read in context →

Q4 and Full Year 2025 Earnings Call — Q4 FY2025

The annual call: full-year economics, the first full read on IMG integration, and the 2026 framework the company is now being judged against. · Open the full transcript →

The stated synergy target for IMG — 25% revenue uplift — and the flywheel logic behind it.

Carsten Koerl (Chief Executive Officer): The customer response has been strong with the majority of our clients, including all of the tier one partners, having already signed on the IMG data odds and AV products. This early and significant progress puts us firmly on track to unlock anticipated revenue synergies of 25% for IMG in 2026. On the product side, we have successfully integrated IMG content into our core product suite and are on track to expand it into our next-gen offerings, including Foresight, Micro Markets, Player Props, and the Virtual Live Match Tracker over the course of the year. This rapid integration and uptake validates our flywheel. We can monetize this content across more customers and products to unlock significant accretive revenue growth.

p. 8 · Read in context →

Scale in two numbers: matches streamed and $52bn of managed-trading turnover, which is what the odds and trading products run on.

Carsten Koerl (CEO): Last year, we streamed over 525,000 matches, which is 100,000 more than we streamed just two years ago. In 2026, we anticipate to stream over 700,000 matches across our global footprint. Switching to our Managed Trading Services, we continue to scale this business in related markets around the globe, we see continued strong momentum ahead. Turnover for 2025 was up 26% year-over-year to $52 billion, making us a top bookmaker globally.

p. 9 · Read in context →

Full-year 2025 in one passage — 17% revenue growth converting into 33% EBITDA growth and 290bp of margin.

Craig Felenstein (Chief Financial Officer): Total company revenue for the full year of $1.3 billion increased $183 million or 17% compared with 2024, driven in large part by higher uptake from our existing partners, strong U.S. market growth, record Managed Trading Services turnover, and contributions related to IMG content. Our growth was broad-based with strength across our product portfolio, including betting and gaming content, Managed Trading Services, and our marketing and media services business.

We generated strong gains both in the U.S. and globally with the U.S. up 23% year-onyear, now 25% of our total revenue, and the rest of the world up 15%. Importantly, the steps we have taken to align our cost base with the revenue opportunities are enabling us to deliver significant operating leverage. Record Adjusted EBITDA of $297 million for the year increased $74 million or 33% compared with a year ago. The company increased full year Adjusted EBITDA margins by over 290 basis points to 23%.

p. 12 · Read in context →

Unit economics of the iGaming push: an iGaming player is worth about 4x a sports bettor, with sports betting as the acquisition channel.

Carsten Koerl (CEO); Chad C. Beynon (Macquarie Capital): This is exactly the opportunity which we pick because we see we have the distribution, we have the iPlayer, we have the live scores, we have the match trackers on the bookmaker side, and we can connect this and convert. Like we all know and like we see it in the handle numbers, a client gets roughly around about 4 times the value for an iGaming player comparing it to a sports bettor. Sports betting is used as the acquisition channel, and here it closes to the 360 degree because we hook it up with our ads for the acquisition. That is the scale.

p. 21 · Read in context →

Where Sportradar thinks it can sell into prediction markets — real-time pricing data for market makers, not just feeds.

Carsten Koerl (CEO); Shaun Kelley (Bank of America): The real interesting thing is the live development in that sector. In-play parlays, live opportunities, that needs real-time data. Like we all know, this is where we can monetize best with the real-time data. The market maker segment is specifically interesting because they need real-time data to price this, and they need the models to lay the liquidity there. Even more, and the real goal is, can we predict the next movement better than anybody else? We can because we are sitting on this huge knowledge, we are sitting on the liquidity, and we are sitting on the deep data in real time.

Our investment here, for example, in the foundation model, where we can predict the next pixel, and we do this now seven seconds for an NBA match, is super helpful to predict potential moves and to underlie them with liquidity. That is exactly where the sweet spot sits. As you hear, that makes us very optimistic that we can help the market makers with a very superior product.

p. 22 · Read in context →

Buyback mechanics stated plainly: a price-sensitive grid, with opportunistic top-ups.

Craig Felenstein (CFO); Jordan Bender (analyst): When you think about how we buy back our shares, we predominantly buy back according to a grid. We have done that historically. We are opportunistic on top of that, like we were with our secondary buyback in the middle of last year.

p. 27 · Read in context →

A rare piece of self-limiting sizing — prediction markets framed as tens of millions, not hundreds.

Carsten Koerl (CEO); Bernie McTernan (Needham): we expect an uplift opportunity in the $ tens of millions, not in the $ hundreds of millions, from prediction markets. Looking on the global scale, yes, we have to focus to keep that machine running, which is internationally significantly bigger than inside the U.S.

p. 34 · Read in context →

Which half of the IMG synergy case is bankable: cost savings are identifiable, revenue synergies depend on client dialogue.

Craig Felenstein (CFO); Bernie McTernan (Needham): Sure. I would say we are not saying that our revenue synergies are fully baked in. Obviously, a lot of this comes down to what sort of content our customers wanna take, what kind of products we develop that we can ultimately sell to our customers. I would say there is definitely some additional revenue upside that can be had from an IMG perspective, depending on the dialogue that we have with our clients. On the cost side, I think I would not say that they are baked into 2026, but I would say that they are easier to identify.

p. 34 · Read in context →

Q4 and Full Year 2024 Earnings Call — Q4 FY2024

The call where the IMG ARENA acquisition and the MLB renewal were laid out, together with the clearest statement of how Sportradar underwrites sports rights. · Open the full transcript →

The IMG ARENA acquisition announced — the deal that reshapes the rights portfolio.

Carsten Koerl (Chief Executive Officer): As you may have already seen this morning, we announced that we are further expanding our leading global content portfolio as we entered into an agreement with Endeavor and WME-IMG to acquire IMG ARENA and its global sports betting rights portfolio. I am incredibly excited about this acquisition, which enhances our footprint in some of the most bet-upon sports, including tennis, soccer, and basketball, and will deliver significant value to our clients, partners, and shareholders. The deal, once closed, is expected to be immediately accretive to our business and margins.

p. 4 · Read in context →

MLB takes equity alongside a renewal; management ties rights discipline to the confidence to buy IMG's portfolio.

Carsten Koerl (CEO): As part of the agreement, MLB has also taken an equity stake in Sportradar, further solidifying our long-term partnership. The disciplined approach we have taken with our existing sports rights and the strong returns we are generating is what gave us confidence in the opportunity to acquire the portfolio of rights from IMG ARENA.

p. 5 · Read in context →

What was actually acquired, sized: 70+ rightsholders, ~39,000 data events, and 70% concentrated in the three biggest betting sports.

Carsten Koerl (CEO): Maximizing the value of high-demand content for our clients and league partners is what we do best, and this portfolio, comprised of relationships with over 70 rightsholders and covering approximately 39,000 oficial data events and 30,000 streaming events across 14 global sports on six continents, provides a variety of growth avenues. Importantly, approximately 70% of these rights are spread across the top 3 sports for global betting turnover, basketball, soccer, and tennis, greatly enhancing our status as the No. 1 content provider in core betting sports while also expanding our content offerings in emerging live betting sports.

p. 5 · Read in context →

The unusual consideration: Endeavor pays Sportradar to take the portfolio on.

Carsten Koerl (CEO): Instead, Endeavor will be providing financial consideration of $225 million, including cash compensation of $125 million to Sportradar and up to 100 million to certain sports rightsholders, which will reduce our future obligations.

p. 6 · Read in context →

How trading data feeds the advertising business — 80 million bettors' behaviour lowering client acquisition cost.

Carsten Koerl (CEO): MTS has value outside the pure trading and risk management, providing us with unique insights into bettors across hundreds of books. By managing the bets of 80 million unique bettors last year alone, we are able to gain a deeper understanding of their preferences and dynamics. This insight informs our ads business and our ability to target, acquire, and engage sportsbook customers at a lower acquisition cost than other peers.

p. 8 · Read in context →

The distribution argument for the deal — 800 bookmakers, 900 media companies — and the ATP precedent for monetising acquired rights better.

Carsten Koerl (CEO); Ryan Sigdahl (Craig-Hallum Capital Group): One is the strategic one. The second one is the commercial one. Looking to the strategic, we scale and we are the premium provider for the B2B sports, so that makes us even stronger. Looking to the coverage, we expand the coverage, and we do this in our key sports.

That's tennis, that's basketball, that's soccer. That's very complementary. Looking to our ability, and you touched on this, we saw what has happened with ATP, which we took from IMG beginning of 2024. We managed this property significantly better, and that is given the scale which we have.

We have 800 bookmakers. We have 900 media companies connected to this machine. And this is a well-oiled machine. We are global from a footprint, and we simply have to leverage on this. Looking now to the commercials, the deal is accretive to the revenues, obviously. It is accretive to the margin, and it's accretive to cash flow. So, the ROI which we deliver with this deal is sensational, and that is the reason why we are so excited about it.

p. 16 · Read in context →

Pressed on buying a loss-making asset, Carsten sets out the rights underwriting test and the ~$100m spent repricing deals.

Carsten Koerl (CEO); Robin M. Farley (UBS): We look to each and every right. We look to the revenues, what they generate.

And we looked to our upselling abilities and the cross-selling abilities. We looked into can we use this content if we put it in our engine to get more revenue channels than they have. And then we're coming to a picture and saying, well, we believe, with this content, we can generate those revenues. And that was the first criteria.

Second was is this accretive to our EBITDA? That is a very, very clear point of decision and saying if we are doing something which is not accretive, we are not interested. And that's the reason why we did the deal. So, it's accretive to our EBITDA and it's accretive to the cash. We needed some money to repair some deals, only a few, which are probably not in the current market from a pricing perspective, and that's what you see in the segments.

We said around about 100 million has been used in prepayments to the leagues to get those deals more in line with market conditions that we can monetize on them.

p. 24 · Read in context →

Capital allocation stated as a ranked test: reinvest, then M&A, both gated on margin accretion, then buybacks.

Craig Felenstein (Chief Financial Officer); David Katz (Jefferies): But I will say this, it is always one of three options that we have. We are always looking at ways to invest in our existing core assets. Given the high margins we have in our existing business, we want to continue to expand the margins in our existing business, and we're not going to jeopardize that by putting too much money back into the business. Same goes for any M&A opportunity.

It has to be margin-accretive for us to do it. So, if we can't find either of those two things, then we will go ahead and return capital to shareholders. And because of the cash we have, we do have the ability to do both.

p. 28 · Read in context →

Q3 2021 Earnings Call — Q3 FY2021

The first calls as a public company, and still the best zero-to-one explanation of the model — rights, liquidity, MTS pricing power — alongside the landmark NBA renewal. · Open the full transcript →

Why the global business dwarfs the US one: soccer handle versus NFL handle, stated in euros.

Carsten Koerl (Chief Executive Officer): Soccer is the most bet on sport in the world with a handle of 850 billion euros each year, far exceeding the handle of American sports, such as the NFL, which is 41.87 billion annually.

p. 8 · Read in context →

The exclusivity philosophy, tested against the NFL loss: exclusive only where the economics work, and no betting client lost.

Carsten Koerl (CEO): I'll close my discussion around the data rights deals by addressing our position on exclusive data.

We seek exclusive data deals only when the economics make sense. But we also have access to enormous amount of data that we are able to monetize, even if we don't have exclusive rights. I'm pleased to say that we have not lost a single betting client due to not having the exclusive rights to NFL data. We have kept our position as the preferred supplier for every U.S.

betting operator and did not lose any existing contracts.

p. 9 · Read in context →

What Managed Trading Services actually is, and the customer count behind it — the base for a product now central to the model.

Carsten Koerl (CEO): Our MTS offering is a sophisticated, turnkey trading, risk, live odds, and liability management solution that helps betting operators boosting margins and profits while increasing eficiency and managing risks.

Overall, we grew our MTS customers from 158 globally in the third quarter of 2020 to 192 globally, this quarter.

p. 10 · Read in context →

The rationale for the landmark NBA renewal — live betting, not pre-match, is what the rights were bought for.

Carsten Koerl (CEO); David Karnovsky (J.P. Morgan): Yes. Good question, David. So, this deal was a long effort, and we discussed it since quite a while with our partners, and we're super happy that we could announce it today. The U.S.

is undoubtedly the biggest growth opportunity which we see in front of us, and we want to focus on creating value, so investments in the United States are our top priority. The NBA is the top betting sports in the United States by pre-match, but more important by live. Live is something that we see main trend in the United States, and we see a lot of opportunities to monetize here with our live odds and with our managed trading services products. This was a main motivation.

p. 15 · Read in context →

On leagues taking equity: treated as an exception for the NBA, not a template — a commitment worth checking against later deals.

Carsten Koerl (CEO); Jason Bazinet (Citi): As a very general statement, I think you will not see too many equity deals from Sportradar, like we did it now with the NBA. The NBA is our most important partner, was our most important partner from the scope and from the size, and also looking to the extensive partnership. So, that was a very clear step for us to do this, to group with our partner where we enjoyed in the last seven years a sensational cooperation.

p. 18 · Read in context →

The core economic engine explained: aggregated betting liquidity becomes pricing power through AI-set fair prices.

Carsten Koerl (CEO); Shaun Kelley (Bank of America Merrill Lynch): The more tickets and liquidity you aggregate, the better you are in a position to use AI to compile what we call a fair price. And that gives you over the long term, if you have more liquidity and diversity, pricing power for this.

I think that's not disputed from one of the players in the market. It's only the question how quickly can you reach a position if your pricing power is big enough to generate alpha with the prices.

p. 24 · Read in context →

The insourcing threat answered on its merits — operators build only where a supplier cannot serve them better.

Carsten Koerl (CEO); Shaun Kelley (Bank of America Merrill Lynch): I think, whenever we can provide superior service to our clients, the bookmakers, they will not hesitate to take it. And there are some bookmakers which simply might see that there is an edge if they have their own platform. I think in a very general way, the platform is a software business. And the sports betting operators which have to do the branding, the marketing, the licensing, a lot of daily operations, I think there are very qualified companies doing software development and managing the modules like I just said it to you. That's our opinion about the debate of insourcing and outsourcing. I think it's simply weighted by who can provide the more eficient and better service that our clients can have a better offer and be more profitable. And this is the decision point.

p. 24 · Read in context →

More calls

Q3 2025 Earnings Call — Q3 FY2025 · 36 pages · Where the IMG ARENA close and the initial 23%-25% constant-currency 2026 growth framework were first put on the table. · Open →

Q2 2025 Earnings Call — Q2 FY2025 · 33 pages · Go here for the pre-close IMG regulatory path and the mid-year check on the Investor Day targets. · Open →

Q1 2025 Earnings Call — Q1 FY2025 · 32 pages · The first call after the April 2025 Investor Day, restating the medium-term growth and margin targets in Q&A. · Open →

Q3 2024 Earnings Call — Q3 FY2024 · 31 pages · The quarter management points to as the operating-leverage inflection, with the ATP and NBA rights costs already in the base. · Open →

Q4 and Full Year 2023 Earnings Call — Q4 FY2023 · 34 pages · The investment-year defence: guiding through the first full year of stepped-up NBA and ATP rights expense. · Open →

Q3 2023 Earnings Call — Q3 FY2023 · 36 pages · The quarter the renewed NBA deal economics began hitting the P&L, with management setting expectations for the cost step-up. · Open →

Q4 and Full Year 2022 Earnings Call — Q4 FY2022 · 26 pages · Carsten's value-chain ladder — data, then predictive models, then trading, then platform — plus the ATP rights win and the Vaix AI acquisition. · Open →

Q4 and Full Year 2021 Earnings Call — Q4 FY2021 · 38 pages · The original post-IPO guidance framework and segment reporting, useful as the baseline the later margin story is measured from. · Open →

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Sportradar Group AG's annual reports contain management's most considered account of the business. These are the sections, passages and visual pages worth opening in the originals preserved in Sources.

Sportradar Group AG — FY2025 Annual Report (Form 20-F) — FY2025

€1.29bn revenue, the IMG ARENA acquisition, prediction markets as a new competitive vector, and a second year of failed internal control. · Open the full document →

We depend on the success of our strategic relationships with our sports league partners, and our inability to maintain, extend, or establish new relationships may cause loss of competitive advantage, unanticipated costs, or require us to modify, limit, or discontinue certain offerings, which could materially affect our business, financial condition, and results of operations. — p. 13 · Read the full section →

The supply side of the business: rights it does not own, renewed on someone else's terms, now bid for by prediction markets too.

Our market is competitive and we may lose clients and relationships to both existing and future competitors. Potential changes in competitive landscape, including new market entrants or disintermediation by participants in the industry, could harm our business. In addition, the introduction of sports-event contracts trading offered by prediction markets creates uncertainty affecting our business. — p. 14 · Read the full section →

New this year: CFTC-regulated event contracts sit outside the state betting regime Sportradar's clients are licensed under.

Prediction markets framed as opportunity and threat at once, across competitive, regulatory and contractual lines.

In the United States, prediction markets, which are CFTC-regulated platforms that allow participants to trade event contracts based on the outcome of future events, are emerging as a potential innovation in sports engagement and data monetization. While these prediction markets has created and could create more opportunities for us to leverage our data and other products and services, they also present significant uncertainties. These uncertainties include, among others, competitive risks, regulatory risks and contractual risks.

p. 14 · Read in context →

The dual class structure of our ordinary shares has the effect of concentrating voting power with our Founder, which will limit a shareholder’s ability to influence the outcome of important transactions, including a change in control. — p. 42 · Read the full section →

Class A holders own economics, not control: the founder holds 78.5% of voting power through low-par Class B shares.

Founder voting power at December 31, 2025, and what it forecloses.

As of December 31, 2025, our Founder, Carsten Koerl, holds all of the issued and outstanding shares of our Class B ordinary shares, which, together with his outstanding Class A ordinary shares, constitutes 78.5% of the total voting power of our outstanding share capital. Accordingly, our Founder is able to significantly influence matters submitted to our shareholders for approval, including the election of directors, amendments of our organizational documents and any merger, consolidation, sale of all or substantially all of our assets or other major corporate transactions. […] This concentrated control may have the effect of delaying, preventing or deterring a change in control of our company, could deprive our shareholders of an opportunity to receive a premium for their share capital as part of a sale of our company and might ultimately affect the market price of our Class A ordinary shares.

p. 42 · Read in context →

Item 4.B Business Overview — p. 48 · Read the full section →

Management's own definition of the business, and the rights portfolio it treats as the moat.

What Sportradar sells and to whom, in management's words.

Sportradar is a leading technology platform enabling next generation engagement in sports and the number one provider of B2B solutions to the global sports betting industry based on revenue. We provide mission-critical products, data and content to sports leagues and federations, betting operators and media companies. […] We offer one of the most robust platforms with seamless integrations between leagues, betting operators and media companies. This enables us to be a trusted partner and leader in navigating the complexities of the highly regulated betting industry. Our software solutions cover a broad range of the sports industry needs, from data collection and processing to visualization, risk management, and platform services.

p. 48 · Read in context →

The named Tier 1 exclusive rights behind the moat claim.

We also leverage our highly diversified sport rights partnerships as a key competitive advantage for our product offerings and client solutions. We have strategically cultivated sport partnerships that include a range of exclusive rights with many Tier 1 properties, including, but not limited to, the National Basketball Association (“NBA”), Major League Baseball (“MLB”), the National Hockey League (“NHL”), the PGA Tour, Major League Soccer (“MLS”), Association of Tennis Professionals (“ATP”), Fédération Internationale des Associations de Football (“FIFA”), the South American Football Confederation (“CONMEBOL”), Union of European Football Associations (“UEFA”), the Asian Football Confederation (“AFC”), and the Deutsche Fußball Liga (“DFL”).

p. 49 · Read in context →

Key Financial and Operational Performance Indicators — p. 67 · Read the full section →

The scoreboard management runs on, plus its argument for why sport rights amortization stays inside Adjusted EBITDA.

Why the capitalize-or-expense choice on licenses drives reported results.

License fees relating to sport rights are a key component of how we generate revenue and one of our main operating expenses. Only licenses that meet the recognition criteria of IAS 38 are capitalized. The primary distinction for whether a license is capitalized or not capitalized is the contracted length of the applicable license. Therefore, the type of license we enter into can have a significant impact on our results of operations depending on whether we are able to capitalize the relevant license. As such, our presentation of Adjusted EBITDA reflects the full costs of our sport rights licenses.

p. 67 · Read in context →

Components of our Results of Operations — Revenue — p. 71 · Read the full section →

How the money is actually made: five revenue lines, and contracts split between fixed minimums and GGR revenue share.

The two contract forms behind Betting Technology & Solutions revenue.

Client contracts are typically based on either: (i) a “fixed-fee recurring” basis, requiring clients to pay a guaranteed minimum recurring fee for a specified number of events, with incremental per-event fees thereafter, or (ii) a variable “revenue share” basis, based on a percentage share of the client’s gross gaming revenue (“GGR”), typically with minimum payment guarantees. Our recurring revenue is generally contracted for terms of one to five years with minimum guarantees and usage-based surcharges. The minimum guarantee amounts are generally recognized over the life of the contract on a straight-line basis, while generally variable fees based on profit sharing and per event overage fees are recognized as earned.

p. 71 · Read in context →

Comparison of Results for the Fiscal Years Ended December 31, 2025 and 2024 — p. 73 · Read the full section →

Where profit tripled: a €117m swing in FX on dollar sport-rights payables sits alongside 17% revenue growth.

Management's attribution of the revenue increase by product group.

Betting Technology & Solutions revenues of €1,047.1 million were up 15% year-over-year primarily driven by a 16% increase in Betting and Gaming Content due to customer uptake of our content and products, contributions related to the acquisition of IMG ARENA, as well as from U.S. market growth, partially offset by the impact of foreign currency movements. Managed Betting Services revenues of €229.8 million were up 15% driven by strong growth in Managed Trading Services due to higher turnover and new clients. […] Sports Content, Technology & Services revenues of €242.9 million increased 22% year-over-year primarily driven by a 24% increase in Marketing & Media Services due to increased spending from technology and media customers and contributions related to our expanded affiliate marketing capabilities.

p. 74 · Read in context →

Item 15. Controls and Procedures — p. 107 · Read the full section →

A second straight year of ineffective internal control, and an adverse ICFR opinion from KPMG alongside a clean audit opinion.

Note 2.3 Use of judgments, estimates and assumptions — a) Newly acquired or modified sport rights licenses — p. 131 · Read the full section →

Whether a league deal becomes a €1.5bn intangible or an expense turns on IAS 38 judgment; KPMG calls it a critical audit matter.

Sportradar Group AG — FY2023 Annual Report (Form 20-F) — FY2023

Included for one section only: the last segment disclosure before the January 2024 collapse to a single reportable segment. · Open the full document →

Note 5. Segmental information — p. 163 · Read the full section →

The last edition to report by segment: from January 1, 2024 Sportradar reports as one segment, so this split is never repeated.

The three reportable segments as defined before the 2024 consolidation.

During the years ended December 31, 2023, 2022 and 2021, the Company has the following divisions which are its reportable segments. These divisions offer different services and are managed separately by region

p. 163 · Read in context →

More annual reports

Sportradar Group AG — FY2024 Annual Report (Form 20-F) — FY2024 · 183 pages · Where the material weakness was first reported, and the first year presented on a single-segment basis. · Open →

Sportradar Group AG — FY2022 Annual Report (Form 20-F) — FY2022 · 205 pages · €730m revenue year on the old three-segment basis, before the 2023 restructuring. · Open →

Sportradar Group AG — FY2021 Annual Report (Form 20-F) — FY2021 · 213 pages · First annual report after the September 2021 Nasdaq listing; the baseline description of the platform. · Open →

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Competitors describe Sportradar Group AG's market in their own filings and calls. These verified passages and visual pages show where their strategies meet, using source documents preserved in Sources.

Genius Sports (GENI)

Sportradar's closest head-to-head competitor and the only peer that collides with it across the whole stack: exclusive official league data rights, in-play betting feeds sold to sportsbooks, betting-integrated live streaming (BetVision vs. Sportradar's streaming/visualisation), automated computer-vision data capture, and sports advertising technology sold to brands and agencies (vs. Sportradar's ad:s marketing and media services). Both are also chasing the same emerging prediction-market data demand.

Genius Sports' stated sportsbook-customer footprint and retention — circa 500 licensed brands and 120–130% net revenue retention — the scale claim it puts against other B2B betting-data suppliers.

Mark Locke, Chief Executive Officer: Net revenue retention remains in the 120% to 130% range across our Sportsbook customers year after year. We partner with circa 500 licensed Sportsbook brands across regulated markets globally

p. 6 · Read in context →

Genius Sports' stated view that manual, human-keyed data collection is obsolete and that it is taking share as leagues move to automated capture — a direct claim against the operating model both firms have historically run on.

Mark Locke, Chief Executive Officer: Legacy manual data capture, where humans key in events from television feeds is obsolete. Leagues are transitioning towards automated AI-driven solutions, and we are winning that transition. […] We see a meaningful opportunity to take market share and drive incremental revenue with limited additional costs as more leagues make this transition.

p. 9 · Read in context →

Genius Sports' stated distribution gain for its betting-integrated streaming product (6 to over 100 sportsbooks in a year) and its claim to be growing betting revenue at roughly twice the rate of U.S. gross gaming revenue.

Mark Locke, Chief Executive Officer: This time last year, we had 6 Sportsbook customers integrated with BetVision. As of today, that number has grown to over 100 Sportsbooks, representing more than 350 brands. […] And as we have proven consistently, our Betting revenue growth continues to exceed the growth of the overall market. This was the case again in Q3 with the growth of our Betting revenue nearly doubling the growth of our U.S. GGR.

p. 7 · Read in context →

Kambi Group (KAMBI)

A B2B sportsbook supplier that is both a Sportradar data customer and a competitor. Its unbundling into modular services — Odds Feed+ pricing, managed trading and risk, bet builder, esports data via Abios — puts it directly against Sportradar's Managed Trading Services, odds feeds and betting-platform products, and its AI trading programme targets the same automation ground. Kambi's CEO Werner Becher ran Sportradar's US betting arm and then its EMEA/LatAm business before joining in 2024.

Kambi's sizing of the European online betting market (third-party VIXIO forecast of over €20bn online GGR by 2028) and its statement that growth in mature Europe now has to come from taking business off rival suppliers.

2025 Annual Report — Sports betting market, Europe: Europe remains a cornerstone of the global sports betting industry, projected by VIXIO GamblingCompliance to exceed €20 billion in online gross gaming revenue by 2028. It is the most mature region for sports betting globally – meaning fewer new market opportunities and placing the emphasis on winning business from competitor suppliers, an aspect in which Kambi has performed well throughout 2025.

p. 18 · Read in context →

Kambi's named wins for Odds Feed+ and its stated intent to extend from pricing into bet acceptance and risk management — the standalone odds-and-trading ground Sportradar sells into.

2025 Annual Report — Strategic framework: A clear example of this strategy in action is Odds Feed+, Kambi's premium pricing service powered by the Group's significant sports betting liquidity pool. During the year Odds Feed+ established itself as a trusted trading tool for a growing number of leading operators, including FDJ UNITED, Hard Rock Digital, LeoVegas, Superbet and Rei do Pitaco. […] In addition to delivering precise and competitive pricing, Kambi sees opportunities to extend the product's scope across the bet lifecycle, including greater influence over bet acceptance and risk management. This evolution would further grow Kambi's role as a critical trading partner, rather than solely a price provider.

p. 12 · Read in context →

Kambi's characterisation of rival suppliers as still dependent on manual trading and therefore having to cut back their offering after the World Cup — its claim to a structural cost and coverage edge in odds compilation and risk management.

Werner Becher, Chief Executive Officer: With our offering now automated, others still reliant on manual trading will need to scale back down now […] We will not have this need to scale anything down.

p. 5 · Read in context →

Better Collective (BETCO)

The collision is with Sportradar's Marketing & Media Services (ad:s) rather than its data business: Better Collective monetises owned sports audiences and first-party data to acquire and retarget bettors for sportsbooks, through affiliation, paid media and its AdVantage/FanReach adtech stack. It is the same buyer, the same operator marketing budget, and — as Genius Sports' Legend acquisition shows — the same audience-plus-intent layer both data suppliers are moving toward.

How Better Collective defines its own market and revenue model — performance-based sports betting affiliation plus advertising and paid media — the operator acquisition-marketing spend Sportradar's ad:s business also competes for.

2025 Annual Report — We are a global digital sports media group: At the intersection of sports media and sports betting, connecting highly engaged audiences with leading sportsbooks and brands through our trusted brands and products. […] We build scalable sports media brands, products, and platforms, combining content technology, and performance marketing to engage and retain valuable audiences. […] Primarily driven by sports betting affiliation through performance-based revenue share models, complemented by advertising, subscriptions, paid media, and partnerships

p. 6 · Read in context →

Better Collective's stated read on prediction markets as an addressable-market expansion rather than a threat — the same conclusion Genius Sports and Sportradar's other peers reached in the 2025–26 reporting cycle.

2025 Annual Report — Co-CEO & Chair Letter: Prediction markets introduce a new product format and attract incremental user segments, while overlapping meaningfully with our existing sports and sports betting audience. […] Our scalable publishing network and paid media capabilities enable us to work seamlessly with all relevant players in the ecosystem.

p. 11 · Read in context →

BetMakers Technology Group (BET)

The narrowest but most literal overlap: a B2B supplier of racing data, form and content, fixed-odds pricing and race streaming to wagering operators — the horse-racing content and pricing niche within Sportradar's betting-services portfolio. Its customer list (bet365, PA Betting Services, GiG, PMU) is drawn from the same operator base, and it sells its pricing product into Kambi's sportsbook. Featured on racing/wagering technology only; its Global Tote business is out of scope.

BetMakers' self-description of its B2B racing and betting technology footprint — the racing data, content and pricing layer that overlaps Sportradar's racing offering.

FY2024 Annual Report — Racing Enhanced: BetMakers Technology Group (ASX:BET) is a leading international provider of B2B technology products with a global footprint that spans the world's major racing and betting markets. Our technology and service solutions enhance betting on racing at critical points along the life cycle for fixed odds and pari-mutuel wagering, unlocking new revenue streams, expanding markets, and enhancing user experience.

p. 5 · Read in context →

BetMakers' stated FY2024 deal list — race streaming, racing content distribution and a fixed-odds pricing product sold into another Sportradar peer's sportsbook — showing where its wins land in the same operator base.

Jake Henson, Chief Executive Officer: In FY24 we were pleased to enter into a new arrangement with PA Betting Services to launch The AdVantage Platform, a turn-key B2B race streaming and wagering platform for wagering operators. We also signed market access and content agreements with bet365 relating to the US states of New Jersey and Colorado, a new contract to deliver racebook services on GiG's sportsbook platform SportX, a new contract to deliver our newly revamped Price Manager fixed odds solution to Kambi's sportsbook […]

p. 8 · Read in context →

More peer documents

Q4_FY2025 — 26 pages · Genius Sports sizes the market it shares with Sportradar — claiming to outpace 24% growth in global online sports betting GGR — and lays out the Legend acquisition thesis for owning audience and intent alongside official data. · Open →

Q1_FY2026 — 14 pages · Kambi discloses an esports data-provision agreement with Google via its Abios division, citing its own computer vision, data collection and distribution capability — Sportradar's core competence, in a peer's hands. · Open →

KAMBI_annual_report_FY2024 — 101 pages · Prior-year framing of the same modular strategy (Odds Feed+, Managed Trading, Bet Builder, Esports) for a year-over-year read on TAM expansion; also carries the CEO biography describing his years running Sportradar's US and EMEA/LatAm businesses. · Open →

Q4_FY2025 — 13 pages · Full-year results with 2026 guidance bridge, the Kindred turnkey-to-Odds Feed+ transition, and a competitor-switch win (Pickwin in Mexico) — useful for reading B2B supplier churn. · Open →

Q3_FY2025 — 14 pages · Twelve commercial agreements in a quarter including tier-one Odds Feed+ signings, plus the player account management source-code acquisition aimed at markets such as Nevada. · Open →

BETCO_annual_report_FY2024 — 181 pages · Prior-year Better Collective report for the pre-rebasing baseline on audience, Brazil and the North American revenue-share shift that underpins its 2025 competitive-position claims. · Open →

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Source: S&P Capital IQ consensus via Xpressfeed · Generated 2026-07-28.

The consensus tape has turned. Revenue surprises decayed from +7.2% in Q3 2024 to -4.2% in Q1 2026, the largest miss in the visible record, and the FY2027 normalized-EPS consensus has been cut to EUR 0.69 from EUR 0.75 thirty days ago against a revenue line that barely moved. The forward shape still embeds heavy compounding, with revenue growth stepping down from about +21% in FY2026 to about +10% in FY2029 while EBITDA and free cash flow grow faster than revenue in every visible year. Coverage does the rest of the talking: 21 analysts on FY2027 revenue, 3 on normalized EPS, and 2 on all of FY2029.

Revenue surprises decayed from +7.2% to -4.2%, with three straight misses

Current sequences by metric: Revenue: 3 consecutive misses; EPS (normalized): 1 consecutive miss.

Currency: EUR · Scale: money in millions, absolute · Consensus is captured before each actual first became effective.

Quarter	Metric	Consensus	Actual	Surprise	Outcome
Q1 FY2026	Revenue	€361.66m	€346.52m	-4.2%	Miss
Q1 FY2026	EPS (normalized)	€0.05	-€0.01	-118.8%	Miss
Q4 FY2025	Revenue	€369.58m	€368.89m	-0.2%	Miss
Q4 FY2025	EPS (normalized)	€0.10	€0.20	+112.2%	Beat
Q3 FY2025	Revenue	€294.86m	€292.05m	-1.0%	Miss
Q3 FY2025	EPS (normalized)	€0.07	€0.12	+60.0%	Beat
Q2 FY2025	Revenue	€315.48m	€317.79m	+0.7%	Beat
Q2 FY2025	EPS (normalized)	€0.03	€0.01	-65.7%	Miss
Q1 FY2025	Revenue	€307.39m	€311.23m	+1.3%	Beat
Q1 FY2025	EPS (normalized)	€0.05	€0.01	-72.7%	Miss
Q4 FY2024	Revenue	€294.60m	€307.07m	+4.2%	Beat
Q4 FY2024	EPS (normalized)	€0.04	€0.01	-81.9%	Miss
Q3 FY2024	Revenue	€237.95m	€255.17m	+7.2%	Beat
Q3 FY2024	EPS (normalized)	€0.03	€0.08	+160.5%	Beat
Q2 FY2024	Revenue	€263.39m	€278.42m	+5.7%	Beat
Q2 FY2024	EPS (normalized)	€0.05	€0.00	-91.0%	Miss

Estimate momentum

The EPS cut is recent rather than gradual: the number was higher 30 days ago than it was 90 days ago before dropping to EUR 0.69. FY2028 revenue tells a similar story one year out, sitting about 4% below its 180-day-ago level though it has firmed about 1% in the past month.

Currency: EUR · Scale: money in millions, absolute · Point-in-time consensus; Δ90d is Now versus 90d.

Metric	FY	180d	90d	30d	Now	Δ90d
EPS (normalized)	FY2027	€0.74	€0.72	€0.75	€0.69	-4.8%
Revenue	FY2027	€1.81bn	€1.80bn	€1.78bn	€1.78bn	-1.3%

Revenue growth steps down from +21% to +10% while EBITDA and FCF outpace it

EBITDA and free cash flow are modelled to grow faster than revenue in every year through FY2029. Coverage falls away as the years go out, from 21 analysts on FY2027 revenue to 13 on FY2028 and 2 on FY2029.

Currency: EUR · Scale: money in millions, absolute · YoY uses the prior fiscal year from the feed; analyst count and range use the first displayed period.

Metric	FY2026E	FY2027E	FY2028E	FY2029E	YoY	Analysts	Low / high
Revenue	€1.56bn	€1.78bn	€1.98bn	€2.18bn	+20.6%	21	€1.52bn / €1.56bn
EBITDA	€390.65m	€482.97m	€563.57m	€671.45m	+31.6%	21	€362.59m / €400.15m
Free cash flow	€227.00m	€296.84m	€375.50m	€492.50m	+27.1%	—	—

Revenue estimates cluster within 8%; the FY2027 EPS high is double the low

FY2027 GAAP EPS runs from EUR 0.45 to EUR 0.93 across 18 analysts, and FY2027 net income from EUR 141.1m to EUR 270.7m across 15. The argument is about what falls through to earnings, not about how much revenue arrives.

Currency: EUR · Scale: money in millions, absolute · Spread/mean is absolute high-low divided by absolute mean.

Metric	Period	Mean	Low–high	Spread/mean	Analysts
EPS (GAAP)	FY2027E	€0.66	€0.45–€0.93	73.3%	18
Net income (GAAP)	FY2027E	€192.65m	€141.10m–€270.70m	67.3%	15
Net income (GAAP)	FY2028E	€257.98m	€212.76m–€319.60m	41.4%	10
EBITDA	FY2027E	€482.97m	€439.55m–€506.97m	14.0%	21
Revenue	FY2028E	€1.98bn	€1.92bn–€2.06bn	7.5%	13

22 targets span EUR 13.11 to EUR 30.69, and no analyst carries a sell

Sixteen buys and two outperforms stand against four holds, with no sell or underperform ratings. The mean target of EUR 18.59 sits above the median of EUR 17.24, so the average is pulled up by the top of the range; this source carries no share price, so no upside is computed here.

Currency: EUR · Scale: money in millions, absolute · Analyst counts shown explicitly.

Street view	Reading	Analysts
Recommendation mix	Buy 16, Outperform 2, Hold 4, Underperform 0, Sell 0	22
Consensus score	1.45	22
Target price	mean €18.59; median €17.24; high €30.69; low €13.11	22

Normalized EPS rests on three analysts, and FY2029 on two

Normalized EPS carries just three estimates in every annual period it covers, against 18 on FY2027 GAAP EPS, so the revision signal above rests on a narrow panel. FY2029 revenue, EBITDA and EPS each rest on two estimates, and the mean gross margin falls from 75.6% in FY2027 to 65.7% in FY2028 and 61.3% in FY2029 as the contributing panel thins.

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Visible Alpha broker models via S&P Xpressfeed · 18 brokers · 337 line items · freshest revision 2026-07-23.

Sportradar's models are near-unanimous on revenue and wide open below it: 18 brokers cluster on FY-2026 revenue, then spread FY-2027 net income from €99.8m to €270.7m. The shared story is a margin bend — EBITDA margin 22.6% in FY-2025 to 28.6% in FY-2028 — bought by sport rights expense growth decelerating faster than revenue. Betting gaming content supplies most of the incremental top line, while sports performance and integrity services are small enough that the models barely move on them. Product-level detail rests on 9 to 11 brokers, and several of those lines have not been revised since 7 May 2026.

Margin, not growth, is the modelled story: EBITDA margin 22.6% to 28.6% as revenue growth halves

Rights expense growth falls below revenue growth from FY-2027, and that is where the margin expansion comes from. The Rule of 40 reading peaks in FY-2026 at 45.7 and slips thereafter, so the margin gain does not fully offset the growth fade.

Line	FY-2025A	FY-2026E	FY-2027E	FY-2028E	YoY	Brokers
Growth	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total revenue	€1.29bn	€1.56bn	€1.77bn	€1.96bn	+20.5%	18
Cost driver	—	—	—	—	—	—
Sport rights expenses (including amortization of capitalized sport rights licenses)	€403.47m	€484.77m	€534.72m	€583.05m	+20.2%	16
Profit	—	—	—	—	—	—
EBITDA - Operating	€292.32m	€390.35m	€481.72m	€561.57m	+33.5%	18
EBITDA margin(%)	22.6%	25.1%	27.2%	28.6%	+2.4pt	18
Operating income/(loss)	€162.42m	€241.70m	€325.63m	€395.99m	+48.8%	17
Drop-through	—	—	—	—	—	—
Incremental margin(%)	14.3%	43.5%	39.4%	37.0%	+29.2pt	16
Rule of 40, Revenue growth + EBITDA margin(%)	39.4%	45.7%	41.0%	39.9%	+6.4pt	18
Cash	—	—	—	—	—	—
FCF margin(%)	14.1%	14.3%	15.6%	17.5%	+0.3pt	16

Betting gaming content is the engine — +28% in FY-2026 and most of the incremental euro thereafter

The split between segments is stark: betting technology & solutions is modelled to grow several times faster than sports content, technology & services in FY-2026. Sports performance is the telling negative, modelled to shrink 2.7% in FY-2026 before a modest recovery. Integrity services grows fast off a base too small to matter to the group.

Line	FY-2025A	FY-2026E	FY-2027E	FY-2028E	YoY	Brokers
Segment	—	—	—	—	—	—
Revenue - Betting technology & solutions	€1.04bn	€1.28bn	€1.46bn	€1.63bn	+23.6%	16
Revenue - Sports content, technology & services	€253.29m	€273.00m	€310.06m	€344.75m	+7.8%	16
Product	—	—	—	—	—	—
Revenue - Betting gaming content	€802.48m	€1.03bn	€1.18bn	€1.31bn	+28.3%	11
Revenue - Managed betting services	€237.52m	€256.30m	€288.81m	€326.32m	+7.9%	11
Revenue - Marketing media services	€186.11m	€204.48m	€233.53m	€264.95m	+9.9%	11
Revenue - Sports performance	€46.93m	€45.67m	€49.03m	€52.18m	-2.7%	11
Revenue - Integrity services	€19.12m	€23.34m	€26.77m	€30.85m	+22.1%	11

Quarterly path

EBITDA margin runs 19.6% in 1QFY-2026 against 30.8% in 3QFY-2026. Modelled 1QFY-2027 and 2QFY-2027 margins fall back to 22.5% and 22.8%, so annual margin expansion is back-half weighted rather than steady through the year.

Line	3QFY-2025A	4QFY-2025A	1QFY-2026A	2QFY-2026A	3QFY-2026E	4QFY-2026E	1QFY-2027E	2QFY-2027E	Brokers
Revenue - Betting technology & solutions	€240.97m	€296.84m	€291.97m	€315.35m	€307.59m	€372.87m	€330.02m	€358.33m	16
Sport rights expenses (including amortization of capitalized sport rights licenses)	€72.07m	€120.70m	€122.80m	€128.89m	€92.57m	€141.02m	€134.26m	€140.48m	16
EBITDA - Operating	€78.20m	€85.40m	€71.03m	€79.40m	€116.82m	€128.18m	€89.76m	€98.84m	17
EBITDA margin(%)	26.5%	23.0%	19.6%	20.7%	30.8%	28.6%	22.5%	22.8%	17

Where broker models disagree

Line	Period	Median	Q1–Q3	Min–max	Brokers
Net income/(loss)	FY-2027E	€186.10m	€159.76m–€203.14m	€99.82m–€270.71m	17
Non-capitalized sport right expenses	FY-2027E	€172.74m	€170.12m–€196.46m	€142.98m–€205.83m	10
Incremental margin(%)	FY-2027E	40.5%	35.3%–42.6%	29.5%–52.0%	16
Free cash flow (FCF)	FY-2027E	€285.03m	€273.20m–€302.51m	€166.40m–€321.82m	15
Revenue - Managed betting services	FY-2027E	€287.73m	€274.62m–€303.23m	€254.21m–€318.92m	10

Product splits carry May revision dates; segment EBITDA rests on one broker

Marketing media services, sports performance, integrity services and the sports content, technology & services segment were last revised 7 May 2026, while total revenue and EBITDA carry 23 July 2026. The segment-level EBITDA lines in this feed rest on a single broker and are one analyst's view rather than consensus, so they are excluded above.

Headline P&L consensus, momentum and beat/miss live in the CapIQ tab.

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Source: S&P Capital IQ transcripts via Xpressfeed · latest indexed call 2026-04-28 · generated 2026-07-28.

Latest call digest

Sportradar Group AG, Q1 2026 Earnings Call, Apr 28, 2026 · 2026-04-28T12:00:00

Q1 2026 — call held April 28, 2026. Sportradar moved the call a week earlier than planned. Craig Felenstein said the reason was to get the results out so the company could better capitalize on the opportunity provided by the current share price. The prepared remarks opened not with the quarter but with Carsten Koerl's rebuttal of recent short-seller reports, a $250 million enhanced open market repurchase under the $1 billion authorization, Koerl's stated intention to buy $10 million of stock personally, and the appointment of Sameer Deen as COO effective May 18.

What management put forward. Revenue of 347 million, up 11% year over year and 16% on a constant currency basis; adjusted EBITDA of 66 million at a 19% margin; free cash flow conversion of 67% against 54% a year ago; more than 75% of core betting clients now consuming IMG content, with management saying it expects to exceed the 25% IMG revenue synergy target. Full-year 2026 guidance was reaffirmed at 23% to 25% constant currency revenue growth, $1.56 billion to $1.58 billion reported, adjusted EBITDA of $390 million to $400 million, and 200 to 225 basis points of margin expansion. New in the quarter: restructuring charges of $13 million to $18 million over the remainder of the year, an explicitly slower U.S. market, and prediction-market revenue built into the back half of the guide.

Where the Q&A diverged. Allegations, not the quarter, drove most of the questions. Management walked through a top-down bridge for gray-market exposure — the exposed product lines are in the mid-40% of revenue, less U.S. revenue, less large global operators — landing at a low to mid-single-digit share, with Koerl adding that an AI system run against public market data could put the figure at a maximum of 12%. The second pressure point was the credibility of an unchanged guide after a soft start: marketing services declined, MTS revenue was hit by player-friendly outcomes even with turnover up 24%, and FX cost roughly five points of reported growth. Felenstein declined to give a Q2 number and declined to normalize the MTS outcome effect. Prediction markets was the third: across several analysts the answer held steady — discussions are mature, nothing is signed, and anything announced in the short term is already inside the guide.

Participant coverage from the latest call.

Group	Participants	Count
Management	Operator; James Bombassei — Senior Vice President of Investor Relations & Corporate Finance, Sportradar Group AG; Carsten Koerl — Founder, CEO & Director, Sportradar Group AG; Craig Felenstein — Chief Financial Officer, Sportradar Group AG	4
Analysts	Ryan Sigdahl — Partner & Senior Research Analyst of Institutional Research, Craig-Hallum Capital Group LLC, Research Division; Chad Beynon — MD, Head of US Research & Senior Gaming, Lodging and Theatres Analyst, Macquarie Research; Barry Jonas — MD & Senior Gaming Equity Analyst, Truist Securities, Inc., Research Division; Jeffrey Stantial — Director of Equity Research, Stifel, Nicolaus & Company, Incorporated, Research Division; Shaun Kelley — MD in Americas Equity Research & Research Analyst, BofA Securities, Research Division; Michael Hickey — Senior Equity Analyst, The Benchmark Company, LLC, Research Division; Raymond Bowers — Equity Analyst, Wells Fargo Securities, LLC, Research Division; Robin Farley — Managing Director and Research Analyst, UBS Investment Bank, Research Division; Samuel Nielsen — Analyst, JPMorgan Chase & Co, Research Division; William Lampen — Director and Digital Gaming Analyst, BTIG, LLC, Research Division	10

Curated latest-call exchanges; one row per analyst topic.

Analyst	Firm	Topic	What changed in Q&A
Ryan Sigdahl	Craig-Hallum	Marketing services decline and the reaffirmed guide	Asked what happened in marketing services and what supports an unchanged full-year guide after a softer start. Felenstein called the line historically choppy, cited operators pulling back and holding spend for the World Cup, and named three supports for the guide: marketing recovery, IMG uptake, and back-half prediction-market revenue.
Ryan Sigdahl	Craig-Hallum	Black-market and gray-market revenue exposure	Asked management to quantify revenue from operators in illegal markets. Koerl said the company does not work with black-market operators and works only with licensed operators, then handed to Felenstein for the revenue bridge down to a low to mid-single-digit exposure.
Jeffrey Stantial	Stifel	Licensed B2B distributors reselling into unregulated markets	Asked whether B2B resellers selling into unregulated markets sit inside the low to mid-single-digit figure and, if not, how material those relationships are. The answer restated the top-down revenue bridge and added the maximum-12% simulation figure; the reseller channel itself was not sized.
Chad Beynon	Macquarie	Prediction-market ramp and commercial model	Asked which constituent — exchange, broker or market maker — matters most for a back-half ramp. Koerl distinguished exchange needs (ultra-low latency data and settlement) from market-maker needs (prediction models on deep data), and described the intended model as a fixed fee plus revenue share with a minimum guarantee, still in negotiation.
Shaun Kelley	BofA	Normalized MTS results and what changed in the outlook	Asked management to normalize the outcome-driven MTS shortfall and to lay out the puts and takes since last quarter. Felenstein did not give a normalized figure but did break the outlook change into three parts: a slower U.S. market, more prediction-market contribution, and better IMG cross-sell, with cost savings weighted to the back half.
Raymond Bowers	Wells Fargo	Second-quarter guidance and prediction-market cannibalization	Pressed on whether the company would give a Q2 number given how late in the quarter the call fell. Felenstein declined, saying the company does not guide quarterly, and pointed to marketing softness and U.S. weakness as the drivers of the Q1 gap. Koerl said cannibalization of online sports betting is small on client feedback and the TAM effect is larger.
Robin Farley	UBS	Prediction-market deal timing versus guidance	Asked whether announcements would be additive to guidance. Felenstein drew a clear line: anything announced in the short term should be assumed already included; anything later is additive. Koerl said discussions are at a mature stage but there is nothing to announce.
Robin Farley	UBS	Quantifying the EBITDA shortfall	Asked management to split the gap between sporting outcomes, FX and sports rights ex-IMG. Felenstein pointed to FX as the largest headwind and reiterated that margin still expanded; the sporting-outcome portion was not separately sized.
Michael Hickey	Benchmark	ICE sales-floor allegation	Asked Koerl to address the specific claim that sales staff were receptive to prospects from illegal markets. Koerl described it as a sting on a junior salesperson at a trade show, said the recording did not reflect all his statements, and argued a sales conversation is far from a contract given the subsequent KYC, license and sanctions checks.
William Lampen	BTIG	Recourse on B2B sublicensing, and customer renewals	Asked whether liability for a negative event sits with the B2B partner rather than Sportradar. Koerl used a Bloomberg analogy, said some B2B partners syndicate content without the company's awareness and are shut down when found, and characterized the bulk of pirated content as live match trackers rather than betting functionality. Felenstein said roughly two-thirds of revenue is fixed fee, about a third of which renews each year, and framed those renewals as back-half upside.

Theme tracker

Themes are curator-classified across supplied calls.

Theme	Status	Quarters mentioned	Read-through
IMG ARENA rights integration and revenue synergies	persisted	Q4 2024, Q1 2025, Q2 2025, Q3 2025, Q4 2025, Q1 2026	Announced in Q4 2024, closed in Q4 2025, and the single most consistent management talking point since. The framing has tightened from strategic rationale to a measurable 25% revenue synergy target, which management said in Q1 2026 it expects to exceed. It is also the reason the 2026 flow-through is lower than 2025's, a point Felenstein made when the Q4 2025 guide landed.
Prediction markets	emerged	Q2 2025, Q3 2025, Q4 2025, Q1 2026	First raised by an analyst in Q2 2025 and management-led from Q3 2025 onward. The tone moved from conditional participation to a named driver inside guidance in three quarters, but through Q1 2026 no agreement had been announced. It is now the most-asked topic on the call and the least evidenced by contracts.
Margin expansion from a fixed, long-dated sports rights base	persisted	Q2 2023, Q3 2023, Q4 2023, Q1 2024, Q2 2024, Q3 2024, Q4 2024, Q1 2025, Q2 2025, Q3 2025, Q4 2025, Q1 2026	Present in every call reviewed, with the same mechanic each time: rights amortized straight-line against a growing revenue base. The 2023-2024 version was a promise of an inflection; from Q4 2024 it became a reported outcome. This is the most durable claim in the file and the one with the clearest track record behind it.
Managed Trading Services scale and trading outcomes	persisted	Q2 2023, Q3 2023, Q4 2023, Q1 2024, Q2 2024, Q3 2024, Q4 2024, Q1 2025, Q2 2025, Q3 2025, Q4 2025, Q1 2026	Turnover growth has been reported every quarter, but outcome sensitivity has surfaced three times in the window: the Q3 2023 revenue cut on favorite-heavy soccer results, a limited impact acknowledged in Q3 2025, and again in Q1 2026 on player-friendly February soccer. Management's answer each time is diversity of sports and normalization over time; the pattern is worth noting for a line described as low-volatility.
iGaming as an adjacent market	persisted	Q4 2024, Q1 2025, Q2 2025, Q3 2025, Q4 2025, Q1 2026	Framed as a Brazil test market for five consecutive calls, always with the same 360-degree acquisition-to-retention logic. In Q1 2026 the framing changed: a dedicated brand, Playradar, live across Latin America with a stated European, U.S. and Canadian rollout for the year, built organically with existing resources.
Buyback scale and the valuation-gap argument	persisted	Q4 2023, Q1 2024, Q2 2024, Q3 2024, Q4 2024, Q1 2025, Q2 2025, Q3 2025, Q4 2025, Q1 2026	The authorization has escalated steadily — $200 million in Q4 2023, raised to EUR 300 million in Q3 2025, to $1 billion in Q4 2025, with a $250 million enhanced open market program and a stated personal purchase by the CEO in Q1 2026. Capital-allocation language has moved from investment-first to Felenstein saying there is currently no better use of capital than investing in Sportradar shares.
Gray-market exposure and data distribution controls	emerged	Q3 2025, Q1 2026	First put to management as an aside in Q3 2025, when Koerl described a four-level compliance process. By Q1 2026 it dominated the call, came with a filed 6-K, a quantified revenue bridge and a direct rebuttal of the reports. A short history, but it now sits alongside guidance as the main thing analysts want resolved.
U.S. in-play conversion as the quantified growth lever	dropped	Q3 2023, Q4 2023, Q1 2024, Q2 2024, Q3 2024, Q1 2025, Q2 2025, Q3 2025	For eight calls management put a number on it — roughly 35% of U.S. handle moving toward the 70% to 80% international rate, worth a stated amount of EBITDA per point converted. Neither the Q4 2025 nor the Q1 2026 call returned to it, and no analyst asked. Prediction markets appear to have taken its place as the U.S. growth story.
Taiwan Lottery and the managed platform business	dropped	Q3 2023, Q4 2023, Q2 2024, Q3 2024, Q4 2024	A named growth proof-point through 2023 and then purely a lapping comparison through 2024, after which it disappears from both remarks and questions. Read as a one-off installation rather than a repeatable platform channel, which is roughly how management came to describe it.

Guidance ledger

Quotes, calls, and speakers are source-verified; outcomes are curator-classified.

Verbatim guidance	Call	Speaker	Curator outcome	Outcome note
“As such, we still anticipate constant currency revenue growth of 23% to 25%, which at current FX rates is expected to be between $1.56 billion and $1.58 billion reported.”	Sportradar Group AG, Q1 2026 Earnings Call, Apr 28, 2026 · 2026-04-28T12:00:00	Craig Felenstein	pending	Reaffirmed at the same range set on the Q4 2025 call. Q1 reported growth was 11%, with management attributing the gap to FX, marketing timing and slower U.S. growth and pointing to Q2 and Q3 as the strongest growth quarters.
“We expect to drive significant operating leverage on this revenue growth with adjusted EBITDA growth of 34% to 37% on a constant currency basis, which at current FX rates is expected to be $390 million to $400 million reported with approximately 200 to 225 basis points of margin expansion in 2026.”	Sportradar Group AG, Q1 2026 Earnings Call, Apr 28, 2026 · 2026-04-28T12:00:00	Craig Felenstein	pending	Unchanged from the Q4 2025 guide. Q1 delivered slight margin expansion, with the cost-out program weighted to the back half.
“restructuring charges of between $13 million and $18 million during the remainder of the year”	Sportradar Group AG, Q1 2026 Earnings Call, Apr 28, 2026 · 2026-04-28T12:00:00	Craig Felenstein	pending	First restructuring charge quantified since the 2023 workforce reduction. Management said some of the resulting savings are already factored into back-half margin guidance.
“we anticipate revenue of EUR 1.56 billion to EUR 1.58 billion”	Sportradar Group AG, Q4 2025 Earnings Call, Mar 03, 2026 · 2026-03-03T13:30:00	Craig Felenstein	pending	The first formal 2026 revenue guide; reaffirmed unchanged on the Q1 2026 call.
“we will continue to focus on converting more of every dollar to cash flow and anticipate growing our free cash flow conversion rate above the 56% we delivered in 2025”	Sportradar Group AG, Q4 2025 Earnings Call, Mar 03, 2026 · 2026-03-03T13:30:00	Craig Felenstein	pending	Q1 2026 conversion was 67% versus 54% a year earlier, and management repeated the above-56% expectation for the full year.
“current expectations for the consolidated company is an additional 250 basis points of margin expansion in 2026”	Sportradar Group AG, Q3 2025 Earnings Call, Nov 05, 2025 · 2025-11-05T13:30:00	Craig Felenstein	pending	The formal guide issued one quarter later was 200 to 225 basis points, below this initial indication. Felenstein attributed the lower flow-through mainly to consolidating IMG revenue at close to base-business margins and to one-off Q4 2025 savings.
“We now anticipate revenues of at least EUR 1.290 billion, representing year-over-year growth of at least 17% and adjusted EBITDA of at least EUR 290 million, representing growth of at least 30% versus 2024.”	Sportradar Group AG, Q3 2025 Earnings Call, Nov 05, 2025 · 2025-11-05T13:30:00	Craig Felenstein	kept	The Q4 2025 call reported full-year revenue of EUR 1.3 billion, up 17%, and record adjusted EBITDA of EUR 297 million, up 33%.
“We currently anticipate 2026 revenue growth, including IMG, to accelerate to 23% to 25% range on a constant currency basis.”	Sportradar Group AG, Q3 2025 Earnings Call, Nov 05, 2025 · 2025-11-05T13:30:00	Craig Felenstein	pending	Carried forward unchanged into the formal Q4 2025 guide and reaffirmed again in Q1 2026.
“We now anticipate revenues of at least EUR 1.278 billion, representing year-over-year growth of at least 16%. And we now anticipate adjusted EBITDA of at least EUR 284 million, representing growth of at least 28% versus 2024.”	Sportradar Group AG, Q2 2025 Earnings Call, Aug 05, 2025 · 2025-08-05T12:30:00	Craig Felenstein	kept	Raised again in Q3 2025 and exceeded on the full year, with reported revenue of EUR 1.3 billion and adjusted EBITDA of EUR 297 million.
“For the full year, 2025, we anticipate total company revenue of at least EUR 1.273 billion, representing year-over-year growth of at least 15%”	Sportradar Group AG, Q4 2024 Earnings Call, Mar 19, 2025 · 2025-03-19T12:30:00	Craig Felenstein	kept	The opening 2025 guide, excluding IMG. It was held in Q1 2025 despite FX, raised in Q2 and again in Q3, and finished at EUR 1.3 billion.
“As a reminder, during our Investor Day, we laid out 3-year targets, including 15% revenue CAGR through 2027, which when combined with our stable cost base, will drive margins to 27% by 2027 and over 30% longer term.”	Sportradar Group AG, Q1 2025 Earnings Call, May 12, 2025 · 2025-05-12T12:30:00	Craig Felenstein	pending	Management said on the Q4 2025 call that 2025 ran ahead of year-one expectations against these targets. Two years remain in the window and IMG has since been added to the base.
“We now anticipate revenues of at least EUR 1.09 billion, an increase of EUR 20 million versus our prior guidance and up 24% versus 2023. And we now anticipate adjusted EBITDA of at least EUR 216 million, up EUR 12 million versus our prior guidance and growth of at least 29% versus 2023.”	Sportradar Group AG, Q3 2024 Earnings Call, Nov 07, 2024 · 2024-11-07T13:00:00	Craig Felenstein	kept	The Q4 2024 call reported full-year revenue of EUR 1.1 billion, up 26%, and adjusted EBITDA of EUR 222 million, up 33%.
“We now anticipate revenues of at least EUR 1.07 billion and adjusted EBITDA of at least EUR 204 million or growth of at least 22% versus 2023 on both the top and bottom line.”	Sportradar Group AG, Q2 2024 Earnings Call, Aug 13, 2024 · 2024-08-13T12:30:00	Craig Felenstein	kept	Raised again in Q3 2024 and beaten on the full year on both lines.

Q&A pressure map

Question counts and firms are curator tallies; analyst coverage shown above.

Topic	Questions	Firms	Pressure / response
Short-seller allegations, gray-market exposure and data piracy (Q1 2026)	6	Craig-Hallum, Truist, Stifel, Benchmark, Wells Fargo, BTIG	The single heaviest line of questioning on the latest call, covering revenue exposure to unregulated markets, regulator and league reaction, the ICE sales-floor recording, the claim that profits come from lower-tier leagues, and where liability sits when a B2B partner sublicenses content. Management answered each directly and quantified exposure, but one question went unanswered on its own terms: Stifel asked specifically whether licensed B2B resellers distributing into unregulated markets are inside the low to mid-single-digit figure and how material those relationships are, and the reply re-ran the same top-down revenue bridge without sizing the reseller channel.
Prediction markets (Q1 2026)	6	Macquarie, Truist, Stifel, Wells Fargo, UBS, JPMorgan	Asked from six angles — ramp timing, which constituent matters most, state-level legal limits, marketing and user-acquisition traction, cannibalization of online sports betting, and where the revenue lands at maturity. The answers were consistent and consistently pre-contractual: leagues have granted clearance, product is ready, the model is a fixed fee plus revenue share with a minimum guarantee, and announcements are expected soon. Felenstein's clarification that near-term announcements are already inside guidance is the most useful modelling detail given.
Guidance credibility after a soft Q1 (Q1 2026)	5	Craig-Hallum, BofA, UBS, JPMorgan	Analysts came at the same question repeatedly: what supports an unchanged full-year guide, can the MTS outcome effect be normalized, how much of the EBITDA gap is FX versus sport results, and how the FX headwind phases through the year. Management gave the FX cadence and the three-part bridge on what changed since the last guide, but declined both to quantify the sporting-outcome impact and to give any second-quarter figure.
IMG synergy phasing and durability (Q4 2025)	5	Craig-Hallum, UBS, BTIG, Stifel, Needham	On the prior call the pressure sat almost entirely on IMG: whether the outperformance was IMG or the core business, how fast the content ramps across the wider client base, where in the product mix the 25% synergy shows up, the phasing of revenue versus cost synergies through 2026, and whether revenue upside is already fully baked. Felenstein was clear that revenue synergies are not fully baked while cost synergies are easier to identify, and that 2027 depends on which IMG content the company chooses to keep.

Language shifts

Only language evidence verified against the referenced component is shown.

Observation	Verbatim evidence	Call ID	Component
Prepared remarks acquired a defensive register that has no precedent in the prior eleven calls. The CEO opened by naming and rejecting the reports before turning to results.	“Before we get into the results, I want to address directly the recent self-interested reports published by known short sellers with the intent of driving down our company's stock price.”	1995730448	2
The guidance verb changed. The three prior calls used variants of raising the outlook; this one reaffirms it and pairs the reaffirmation with an acknowledgement of headwinds.	“We are reaffirming our full year 2026 outlook. While there have been some short-term headwinds, there are also a variety of opportunities for the remainder of the year that we expect to capitalize on such as further IMG synergies, the prediction market ecosystem and global customer renewals.”	1995730448	3
U.S. market language turned explicitly negative for the first time in the window. Prior calls described U.S. growth as rapid or strong; here it is a downgrade relative to the guide set eight weeks earlier.	“First and foremost, the U.S. market growth is definitely slower than it was when we were speaking after our fourth quarter results.”	1995730448	29
Cost language moved from managing headcount growth to initiating cuts. The prior four calls framed efficiency as using existing people better; this one names a program with a quantified charge.	“At the same time, we have recently initiated steps to further streamline our business and drive additional cost efficiencies.”	1995730448	3
Prediction-market framing shifted from conditional to assertive in two quarters. In Q3 2025 participation was contingent on how the market developed.	“Should the market continue to develop in the way that aligns with those standards, we see the potential for prediction markets to complement our existing business and create incremental opportunity for Sportradar.”	1966803230	2
By Q1 2026 the same topic is stated as leadership, and the sentence introducing it also concedes the U.S. slowdown — the two are now presented together.	“we see prediction markets as a significant opportunity where Sportradar is uniquely positioned to lead given our premium content, global scale and unmatched product portfolio”	1995730448	2
A new qualifier attached to Managed Trading Services, a line management has otherwise described as insulated from single-event outcomes by its diversity.	“While turnover was strong, our revenues in the quarter were impacted by player-friendly outcomes.”	1995730448	2

The call history supports the operating case and complicates the timing case. Nine of the last ten quantified guides were met or beaten, and the margin mechanic management has described since 2023 — long-dated rights amortized straight-line against a growing base — has delivered. What is new in Q1 2026 is that the growth story rests on two things the transcripts do not yet evidence: prediction-market revenue that is inside the guide but not under contract, and IMG synergies now running ahead of a target that was itself only set one quarter earlier. Against that, the reliably quantified U.S. in-play conversion lever has gone unmentioned for two calls.